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COURTING SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY: 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW IN INDIA† 
DEEPTI SHENOY* 
Learned men see with an equal eye 
a scholarly and dignified priest, 
a cow, an elephant, a dog, 
and even an outcaste scavenger.1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Inequality in India is made particularly pervasive by the fact 
that India’s rigid social hierarchies are intertwined with 
longstanding quasi-religious principles.2  Notwithstanding the fact 
that equality, based on the intrinsic divinity of all beings, is a 
principle inherent to Hinduism3—the country’s dominant religion, 
India has long been defined by a strict system of social 
stratification legitimated by perceived cultural and religious 
principles.4 
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would also like to thank my parents, Sushma and Pradeep Shenoy, for their 
support and assistance, and Jon Dueltgen, for his perspective on American labor 
law.  All remaining shortcomings are attributable to me alone. 
1 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA: KRISHNA’S COUNSEL IN TIME OF WAR 59 (Barbara Stoler 
Miller trans., 1986). 
2 Vikraman Nair, The Search for Equality Through Constitutional Process: The 
Indian Experience, 2001 ACTA JURIDICA 255, 256 (2001) (“Religious tenets, scriptures 
and even customs were distorted and manipulated and were used to 
institutionalise, justify and perpetuate . . . oppression and subordination [by race 
and caste].”). 
3 Id. at 255; see also THE BHAGAVAD-GITA, supra note 1, at 67 (“I exist in all 
creatures, so the disciplined man devoted to me grasps the oneness of life . . . .”). 
4 Nair, supra note 2, at 256. 
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The hierarchies that define Indian society bear upon every 
aspect of life.5  In the realm of employment, hierarchical norms 
define the types of occupations into which a person might enter, as 
well as the conditions of employment she may expect to 
encounter.6  Many industries remain de facto segregated by caste 
and gender.7  Prejudice often operates at a surface level, and a 
certain level of classification by social status is the norm rather 
than the exception.8 
Since employment discrimination in India is primarily the 
result of structural inequalities that assign a subordinate social 
status to women and disadvantaged minority groups, the problem 
is best addressed through a systemic approach that attacks the 
underlying hierarchies directly.9  A substantive conception of 
equality is enshrined in India’s Constitution, which directs the 
state to take affirmative action to empower women and 
disadvantaged minorities to compete, on more equal terms, with 
 
5 CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CASTE 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST DALITS OR SO-CALLED UNTOUCHABLES IN INDIA 54 (2007), 
available at www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/ngos/chrgj-hrw.pdf 
[hereinafter CASTE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST DALITS] (discussing, inter alia, labor 
and employment rights to work, the right to form and join trade unions, housing 
and property rights, the right to access services in a non-discriminatory manner, 
education rights, and the right to equal participation in cultural activities); Sumita 
Ray, The Women’s Reservation Bill of India: A Political Movement Towards Equality for 
Women, 13 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 53, 53 (1999) (discussing labor and 
employment and other rights in the gender context). 
6 CASTE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST DALITS, supra note 5, at 55; SURINDER 
MEDIRATTA, HANDBOOK OF LAW, WOMEN, AND EMPLOYMENT: POLICIES, ISSUES, 
LEGISLATION, AND CASE LAW 2 (2009) (noting the persistence of gender inequality 
in India despite the egalitarian provisions in the Indian Constitution and the 
implementation of myriad International Law Organization conventions and 
recommendations). 
7 CASTE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST DALITS, supra note 5, at 55 (“Dalit’s talents, 
merits, and hard work are of little consequence in a system where occupational 
status is determined by birth.”); see also MEDIRATTA, supra note 6, at 17 (observing 
that female mobility into managerial positions is extremely limited). 
8 Smita Narula, Equal by Law, Unequal by Caste: The “Untouchable” Condition in 
Critical Race Perspective, 26 WIS. INT’L L.J. 255, 260 (2008) (contrasting 
discrimination against Dalits with the South African apartheid system). 
9 Sean A. Pager, Anti-Subordination of Whom? What India’s Answer Tells Us 
About the Meaning of Equality in Affirmative Action, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 329 
(2007) (contrasting caste-based discrimination in India with the “irrational 
prejudice” against an immutable trait such as skin color that underlies racism in 
the United States). 
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members of more privileged social groups.10  The government has 
been guided by this constitutionally-sanctioned substantive 
impetus and has implemented a system of “compensatory 
discrimination” in the form of quotas for women and members of 
disadvantaged castes in government jobs.11  In taking a primarily 
substantive, rather than formal, approach to equality, India rightly 
recognizes that neutral application of laws and policies will 
perpetuate the subordination of already disadvantaged groups.12  
Given the salience of social hierarchies in the Indian context, 
disadvantaged minorities contend with near insurmountable 
barriers to availing themselves of opportunity. 
Despite its commitment to substantive equality, India’s existing 
approach to employment discrimination has fallen short of its 
egalitarian ideals.13  One explanation for this shortfall is the lack of 
a comprehensive employment discrimination framework 
 
10 M. Varn Chandola, Affirmative Action in India and the United States: The 
Untouchable and Black Experience, 3 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 101, 105-07 (1992) 
(noting that the “compensatory discrimination” provisions of the Indian 
Constitution permit unequal treatment based on “reasonable classifications” 
aimed at remedying social ills); see also INDIA CONST. art. 16, § 4 (“Nothing in this 
article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of 
appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the 
opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the 
State.”). 
11 Nair, supra note 2, at 258 (noting, also, quota systems in legislatures, higher 
education, land and housing allotment, health care, scholarships, grants, and legal 
aid).  Compensatory discrimination “is a daring attempt to remedy past injustices 
suffered by those who are at the lower levels of India’s four-tier caste hierarchy.”  
E.J. Prior, Constitutional Fairness or Fraud on the Constitution? Compensatory 
Discrimination in India, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 63, 65-66 (1996). 
12 See Manuela Tomei, Discrimination and Equality at Work: A Review of the 
Concepts, 142 INT’L LAB. REV. 401, 411 (2003) (“[C]onsistent treatment of different 
people may produce unequal results.”); see also Narula, supra note 8, at 314 
(observing that “there are no objective standards of merit applicable to all groups 
within society, given that dominant groups shape traditions within which they 
make judgments of merit”). 
13 See Takahiro Ito, Caste Discrimination and Transaction Costs in the Labor 
Market: Evidence From Rural North India, 88 J. DEV. ECON. 292, 299 (2009) (observing 
that India’s reservation-based approach to employment discrimination has had 
limited impact); see also Sukhadeo Thorat & Paul Attewell, The Legacy of Social 
Exclusion: A Correspondence Study of Job Discrimination in India, 42 ECON. & POL. 
WKLY. 4141, 4144 (2007) (highlighting the high incidence of caste discrimination in 
the relatively unregulated Indian private sector); Geeta Gandhi Kingdon & Jeemol 
Unni, Education and Women’s Labour Market Outcomes in India, 9 EDUC. ECON. 173, 
173 (2001) (“[W]omen do suffer high levels of wage discrimination in the Indian 
urban labour market . . . .”). 
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adequately addressing the myriad of ways discrimination operates.  
The existing legal protections against such discrimination include 
constitutional provisions mandating equality14 and a handful of 
scattered criminal statutes.  There is no umbrella employment 
discrimination statute to regulate private sector workplaces in 
India.15  Reservations, constituting the primary means by which the 
government addresses employment discrimination, do not extend 
to the private or agricultural sectors.  This is highly problematic, 
given the fact that these sectors together encompass the lion’s share 
of the workforce.16  The existing statutory provisions provide some 
measure of protection to women in the private sector workforce, 
but many of these do not address caste discrimination. 
The social affliction engendered by entrenched hierarchies is 
exacerbated by the hesitance of the legislative and executive 
branches of government to take action beyond the existing system 
of quotas to benefit disadvantaged minorities.17  Compensatory 
discrimination has become a highly politicized endeavor, with 
various political parties vying for the support of caste-based 
interest groups.18  In the process, influential members of nominally 
disadvantaged groups are unfairly benefited and the interests of 
the genuinely underprivileged are neglected.19 
The Indian Supreme Court has attempted to fill the void 
created by the legislature’s abdication of responsibility.20  Since the 
late 1970s, the Court has adopted an increasingly activist posture in 
 
14 INDIA CONST. arts. 14–16. 
15 See Anti-Discrimination/Sex Equality, LAWYERS COLLECTIVE, http://www. 
lawyerscollective.org/womens-rights-initiative/anti-discriminationsex-equality. 
html (last visited May 3, 2013) (“There is no comprehensive anti-discrimination 
code in India although there are laws that address specific aspects related to 
equality.”). 
16 See S. Sakthivel & Pinaki Joddar, Unorganised Sector Workforce in India: 
Trends, Patterns and Social Security Coverage, 41 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 2107, 2108–10 
(2006) (noting that approximately 92 percent of India’s workforce is employed in 
the unorganized sector, which accounts for nearly the entire agricultural 
workforce [with the exception of plantation workers] and the vast majority of the 
private sector workforce.  Only approximately 8 percent of the workforce is 
employed in the organized sector, encompassing the whole of the public sector 
workforce and the organized portion of the private sector). 
17 Avani Mehta Sood, Gender Justice Through Public Interest Litigation: Case 
Studies From India, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 833, 845 (2008). 
18 Pager, supra note 9, at 338. 
19 Id. 
20 Sood, supra note 17, at 844. 
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an effort to uphold the rights of the disadvantaged.21  Yet despite 
the Court’s commitment to substantive equality, it has not been 
wholly immune from the regressive, traditional norms that 
pervade Indian society.22  The Court has also selectively 
superimposed formal equality principles on a vision of substantive 
equality colored by traditional norms, an approach that has at 
times yielded unsatisfactory results.23  The Apex Court’s occasional 
reliance on traditional stereotypes has sometimes had the effect of 
calcifying social hierarchies.24  
While the entrenched hierarchies that undergird Indian society 
necessitate a substantive approach to equality that takes into 
account the painfully real social differences that limit access to 
opportunity for certain groups, India’s substantive approach has 
hitherto failed to generate the anticipated results.  The deficiencies 
in India’s approach to substantive equality are the lack of a 
comprehensive framework addressing employment discrimination 
in its various forms and the selective intermingling of formal and 
substantive equality with traditional norms.  This article argues, 
therefore, that India’s commitment to equality in employment 
would be better realized through (1) a comprehensive employment 
discrimination framework, which would ease the litigation burden 
on disadvantaged victims, offer a wider range of remedies than 
those currently available under the constitution and criminal laws, 
and extend the protections of employment equality further than 
the limited sphere to which they currently apply and (2) a strong 
commitment to a primarily substantive approach, disentangled 
 
21 Id. at 837. 
22 See Jeremy Sarkin & Mark Koenig, Ending Caste Discrimination in India: 
Human Rights and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Individuals and Groups from 
Discrimination at the Domestic and International Levels, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 
541, 558–59 (2010) (describing the Indian Supreme Court’s reliance on traditional 
caste identities in reaching some of its judgments). 
23 See, e.g., Javed v. Haryana, A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 3057 (India) (upholding a law 
that prevented men and women with more than two children from serving in 
municipal governments, despite clear evidence that this disproportionately 
burdened and disqualified women, because it was not “arbitrary, unreasonable, 
or discriminatory”); see also Sood, supra note 17, at 888 (quoting Supreme Court 
Justice Ruma Pal as observing, “[t]he most frequent judicial failures to 
conceptualize the offence arise when the Court approaches the issue with certain 
judicial predispositions, based on either class or gender”). 
24 Kalpana Kannabiran, Judicial Meanderings in Patriarchal Thickets: Litigating 
Sex Discrimination in India, 44 ECON & POL. WKLY. 88, 90 (2009). 
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from formal equality and free from the regressive effects of 
traditional stereotypes. 
2. HIERARCHIES 
Perhaps the most visible of India’s social hierarchies, the caste 
system, divides Hindus into four classes, called varnas: the 
Brahmins (priests), the Kshatriyas (warriors), the Vaishyas 
(businesspeople), and the Shudras (laborers), in order of 
descending authority.25  Below the caste system lies a fifth group, 
the Dalits, or scheduled castes, who have historically been 
subjugated through their perceived untouchability, whereby 
contact with them has been viewed as inauspicious and polluting.26  
Within the larger varnas are various subcastes, or jatis, which vary 
from one region to another and which have, over the course of 
time, dictated the occupations into which a person might enter.27  
The caste system is a complex social code, which, as per tradition, 
governs all aspects of human interaction, with the upper castes 
exercising considerable subjugating influence over the lower castes 
and those below the caste system.28  The almost total absence of 
intermarriage across castes reinforces these social divisions.29  The 
system is one of graded inequality, a factor that has significantly 
contributed to its continuing relevance because of the incentive it 
provides at each level to maintain the status quo.30  Thus, certain 
jatis among the Dalits, for instance those involved in the practice of 
manual scavenging or the cleaning of dry latrines, are viewed as 
untouchables even among the Dalits.31 
No less significant in Indian society is the hierarchy that 
separates men from women and draws for legitimacy upon 
gendered cultural values purportedly rooted in religious 
 
25 Sarkin & Koenig, supra note 22, at 547 (identifying and describing the caste 
divisions in India).  
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Priya Sridharan, Representations of Disadvantage: Evolving Definitions of 
Disadvantage in India’s Reservation Policy and United States’ Affirmative Action Policy, 
6 ASIAN L.J. 99, 102 (1999) (describing the caste system as a way of organizing 
Indian society). 
29 Narula, supra note 8, at 276 (“Prohibitions on inter-marriage are not only a 
hallmark feature of the caste system . . . but are essential to maintaining its very 
existence.”). 
30 Id. at 260. 
31 CASTE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST DALITS, supra note 5, at 56. 
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doctrine.32  Traditional conceptions of women as being primarily 
suited to domestic roles have restricted the roles that women, in 
particular, those of the upper castes, have played in the public 
sphere.33  Women who enter the workforce must overcome 
significant hurdles at every step of the way, from contending with 
familial and societal expectations that they remain in the domestic 
sphere to facing discrimination in all aspects of employment.34  
Women of the lower castes are particularly vulnerable due to their 
position at the intersection of caste and sex discrimination.35  These 
women account for the majority of those engaged in what are 
viewed as the most dangerous and degrading occupations and face 
significant opposition to any attempts on their part to empower 
themselves.36  
Inequality in India is particularly problematic because of the 
scale on which it occurs and its tendency to dominate all aspects of 
 
32 See A.P. THAKUR & SUNIL PANDEY, 21ST CENTURY INDIA: VIEW AND VISION 132 
(2009) (observing that, in the Indian social structure, “[m]en outrank women of 
the same or similar age . . . .”).  For an example of the ways in which religious 
gender hierarchies bear upon the Indian system of laws, see Kamala Sankaran, 
Special Provisions and Access to Socio-Economic Rights: Women and the Indian 
Constitution, 23 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 277, 285 (2007) (describing Indian courts’ 
widespread practice of upholding sex discrimination that falls under the purview 
of so-called religious personal laws). 
33 KARIN KAPADIA, Translocal Modernities and Transformations of Gender and 
Caste, in THE VIOLENCE OF DEVELOPMENT: THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY, GENDER AND 
SOCIAL INEQUALITIES IN INDIA 142, 167 (Karin Kapadia ed., 2002) (attributing the 
harsher subordination of women in the higher classes to their seclusion); see also 
Wendy Olsen & Smita Mehta, Female Labour Participation in Rural and Urban India: 
Does Housewives’ Work Count?, 93 RADSTATS J. (2006) (underscoring the perceived 
desirability of the status of a housewife in areas of the country significantly 
influenced by Hindu Brahminical norms, particularly in rural households where 
women are compelled by necessity to work outside the home). 
34 ANIL DUTTA MISHRA, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF WORKING WOMEN IN 
URBAN INDIA 59 (1994) (stating that some of the forms of oppression that women 
experience in the workplace include stares, remarks, and mockery). 
35 See Narula, supra note 8, at 277–78 (noting that Dalit women are uniquely 
oppressed due to their vulnerability to violence, their unequal access to services, 
employment opportunities, and education, and the fact that government 
development programs tend to prioritize initiatives that benefit Dalit men). 
36 Sesha Kethineni & Gail Diane Humiston, Dalits, the “Oppressed People” of 
India: How Are Their Social, Economic, and Human Rights Addressed?, 4 WAR CRIMES, 
GENOCIDE, & CRIMES AGAINST HUMAN. 99, 104–05 (2010); see also Shuriah Niazi, 
Madhya Pradesh’s Manual Scavengers Caste in a Trap, NEWS TRACK INDIA (Jan. 23, 
2009), http://www.newstrackindia.com/newsdetails/64125 (describing the 
occupation of manual scavenging, or the cleaning of non-flushing latrines, which 
many lower-caste and marginalized women feel compelled to enter even though 
they have been outlawed in India). 
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people’s lives.37  As Smita Narula notes, “India is also an example 
of injustice in the extreme: the numbers affected are greater, the 
poverty is deeper, the atrocities are an every day affair, and 
enforced servitude and segregation is the norm.”38  Pervasive de 
facto occupational segregation creates immediately apparent social 
division and limits the ability of members of disadvantaged groups 
to better their social position.  Due to intense discriminatory 
attitudes on the part of employers, skewed distribution of 
resources, and historical patterns of disadvantage, Dalits, the so-
called backward classes (certain of the extremely disadvantaged 
Shudra subcastes), and women are often relegated to menial 
and/or undesirable areas of employment.39  The ingrained 
structures of inequality that constitute the framework of Indian 
society necessitate an approach to equality that takes into account 
the insurmountable barriers that prevent certain sections of society 
from availing themselves of opportunity.  
3. INDIA’S APPROACH TO EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
The Indian government has primarily taken a substantive view 
of equality, selectively applying formal equality principles in 
certain cases.40  In line with this emphasis, the government has 
focused on compensating for and remedying existing social 
hierarchies.41  Substantive equality recognizes the existence of 
social classifications and seeks to target those social structures that 
contribute to the subordination of historically disadvantaged 
groups.42  Formal equality, in contrast, overlooks social 
classifications and attempts to ensure neutral application of laws 
and policies and non-discrimination among individuals.43  While 
substantive equality, with its recognition of real social differences 
 
37 Narula, supra note 8, at 260. 
38 Id. 
39 CASTE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST DALITS, supra note 5, at 55; MEDIRATTA, 
supra note 6, at 17. 
40 Chandola, supra note 10, at 110. 
41 Sridharan, supra note 28, at 99–100. 
42 Claire McHugh, The Equality Principle in E.U. Law: Taking a Human Rights 
Approach?, 14 IRISH STUDENT L. REV. 31, 34 (2006). 
43 See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
107, 108 (1976) (describing the formal-equality based antidiscrimination principle 
employed by U.S. Courts in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution as reflecting the idea that “similar things should be treated 
similarly”). 
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between groups, embraces affirmative action in favor of 
disadvantaged groups as being in itself an essential part of 
equality, formal equality views affirmative action as an exception 
to equality to be avoided if at all possible.44 
The Indian Constitution contains both formal and substantive 
equality provisions, suggesting recognition on the part of the 
founders that uniformly applied formal equality would perpetuate 
the existing structural inequalities.45  Although the Constitution 
mandates equality under the laws and prescribes a merit-based 
regime of advancement in government employment, it also 
expressly endorses a vision of substantive equality that is anchored 
in affirmative action to empower minorities to compete on more 
equal terms with members of more privileged groups.46  That the 
state has embraced this constitutional directive is evident in the 
fact that the primary approach the government has taken to 
eradicating employment discrimination is a system of 
compensatory discrimination in the form of quotas.47  Under this 
system, 49.5% of positions in higher education and national 
government employment are reserved for members of the 
scheduled and backward classes.48  The reservation system for 
women is less comprehensive, but nevertheless sets aside one third 
of seats in municipal (local) governments for female candidates.49  
Various other affirmative action provisions implemented on 
discretionary bases by the state and central governments 
complement this approach.50  Compensatory discrimination is 
rooted in the belief that, in the absence of strict quotas, minorities 
disadvantaged due to rigid societal hierarchies will be denied 
access to gainful employment.51  There is also the hope that the 
 
44 Jason Morgan-Foster, From Hutchins Hall to Hyderabad and Beyond: A 
Comparative Look at Affirmative Action in Three Jurisdictions, 9 WASH. & LEE RACE & 
ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 73, 81 (2003). 
45 Chandola, supra note 10, at 110. 
46 Sridharan, supra note 28, at 144. 
47 Id. at 111–12. 
48 Morgan-Foster, supra note 44, at 87. 
49 Raghabendra Chattopadhyay & Esther Duflo, Women as Policy-Makers: 
Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India, 72 ECONOMETRICA 1409, 1410 
(2004). 
50 MARC GALANTER, COMPETING EQUALITIES: LAW AND THE BACKWARD CLASSES 
OF INDIA 380 (1984). 
51 See Prior, supra note 11, at 77–78 (“The [framers of India’s Constitution] 
believed that compensatory discrimination in this field was both a method to 
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increased presence of members of disadvantaged groups in 
positions of power will translate into more opportunities for 
members of these groups across the board. 
In addition to constitutional protections against employment 
discrimination, the legislature has enacted a handful of statutes 
that address various aspects of discrimination in the workplace.  
For the purposes of this analysis, the most significant of these 
statutes is the Equal Remuneration Act of 1976, which guarantees 
women equal treatment in the workplace.52  The Act forbids 
discrimination in hiring, pay, and conditions of employment 
between male and female workers engaged in the same or similar 
work, except where dissimilar treatment is mandated or permitted 
under the law.53 
4. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
Although India’s primarily substantive approach to equality in 
employment rightly recognizes the potential for perpetuation of 
existing hierarchies in the absence of special solicitude for the 
interests of the disadvantaged,54 the Indian approach has failed to 
generate the anticipated results.  The shortcomings of the Indian 
approach lie in: (1) its limited reach, (2) the near abdication of 
responsibility by the legislative branch of government, and (3) the 
judiciary’s seemingly incoherent superimposition of formal 
equality principles on a vision of substantive equality colored by 
regressive cultural norms. 
 
strengthen India’s underprivileged and a means of preventing upper classes from 
obstructing the admission of backward classes into government employment.”). 
52 Equal Remuneration Act, 1976, No. 25, Amendment 1987, No. 49 (India).  
53 Id.  Cf. Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1963) (forbidding discrimination in 
wages between men and women engaged in similar work in regulated American 
workplaces). 
54 Sandra Fredman, Facing the Future: Substantive Equality Under the Spotlight 
25 n.62 (Univ. of Oxford Legal Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 57, 
2010) (noting that the Indian substantive equality approach allows individuals 
who show socio-economic disadvantage as well as membership in a certain 
disadvantaged status group to qualify for benefits in order to achieve equality.  In 
addition, the Indian Constitution permits special provisions to be made for two 
categories of disadvantaged groups, of which one is comprised of “Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes”). 
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4.1. The Lack of a Comprehensive Framework 
The lack of a comprehensive legal framework to address 
employment discrimination in its various forms imposes 
significant barriers to the realization of a robust equality of 
employment opportunity in India.  India has thus far relied almost 
exclusively on its system of compensatory discrimination to root 
out such inequality, and this approach has met with only moderate 
success.55  A system grounded almost entirely on quotas is 
inherently limited because it disregards the manifold ways in 
which discrimination and structural inequality may operate in the 
workplace.56  For example, a quota system does not address 
disparities in wages, promotion opportunities, and conditions of 
employment.  The limitations of India’s reservation-based 
approach are compounded by the fact that reservations are 
primarily concentrated in relatively undesirable areas of 
employment such as menial or janitorial work.57  In this manner, 
members of disadvantaged groups remain segregated in areas of 
employment traditionally associated with their castes.58  Instructive 
in this regard is the experience of nearly a hundred Dalit workers 
in the city of Ahmedabad, who, despite having advanced degrees 
in a range of subjects, could find only janitorial employment.59  
In practice, reservations benefit less than one percent of the 
Dalit population.60  The private and agricultural sectors, which 
together account for a huge percentage of the total market, are 
 
55 Sridharan, supra note 28, at 111–12 (“India’s policy of ‘compensatory 
discrimination’ consisted primarily of quotas, or strict reservations of designated 
percentages of government positions for beneficiary groups, according to their 
representation in the society.  Membership in a beneficiary group alone qualified 
a candidate to receive a reserved position.”). 
56 See Ito, supra note 13, at 299 (underscoring the limitations of India’s 
reservation-based approach to employment discrimination). 
57 See CASTE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST DALITS, supra note 5, at 28 (noting that 
Dalits occupy more than 65 percent of government sweeping positions and only 
16.7 percent of non-sweeping positions). 
58 Id. 
59 Randeep Ramesh, Untouchables in New Battle for Jobs, THE GUARDIAN 
(Manchester), Oct. 2, 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/oct/03/ 
india.randeepramesh. 
60 Narula, supra note 8, at 312–15 (arguing that although reservations 
provided greater opportunities for Dalits to reach political and government 
positions, as well as positions as engineers and surgeons, they have not yet 
benefited the majority population of Dalits). 
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outside the purview of reservations.61  The recent trend toward 
liberalization, with its concomitant privatization of industries, has 
further limited the compensatory discrimination system by taking 
these jobs out of the reach of reservations.62  Due to a range of 
factors, including resistance on the part of private employers and 
the informal working conditions prevalent in agricultural work, 
these sectors have been left almost wholly unregulated.63  
Although the Equal Remuneration Act and a smattering of other 
legislation provide women in private sector workplaces with some 
measure of protection from discrimination, members of the 
scheduled and backward classes are excluded from many of these 
protections under the existing statutory scheme.64  Discrimination 
outside the public sector is both blatant and rampant.  To take one 
example, as reported in The Guardian’s story of Dalits battling for 
better jobs, Prakash Chauhan, who held a masters degree in 
Commerce, found his offer of employment at an accounting firm 
rescinded upon the firm’s discovery that he was a Dalit.  Chauhan 
 
61 See Thorat & Attewell, supra note 13, at 4144 (“[I]t appears that caste 
favouritism and the social exclusion of dalits . . . have infused private enterprises 
even in the most dynamic modern sector of the Indian economy.”).  For 
employment figures, see Employment in Public and Organised Private Sectors, 
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/PublicationsView.aspx? 
id=13602 (last visited May 3, 2013); see also BINO PAUL ET AL., INDIA LABOUR 
MARKET REPORT 2008 (2009), available at http://www.macroscan.org/anl/may09/ 
pdf/Indian_Labour.pdf (analyzing Indian labor market composition, trends, and 
issues) . 
62 Narula, supra note 8, at 318 (stating that the economic liberalization in 
India, or more specifically, the philosophy of increased reliance on market forces 
and the reduced role of the state, has lead to the shrinking of the public sector and 
thus harmed the efficiency of the reservations model and its possible effects). 
63 See Barbara Harriss-White & Nandini Gooptu, Mapping India’s World of 
Unorganized Labour, 37 SOCIALIST REG. 89, 89 (2001) (“Out of India’s huge labour 
force, over 390 million strong, only 7% are in the organized sector . . . . ‘Organized 
sector labour’ means workers on regular wages or salaries, in registered firms and 
with access to the state social security system and its framework of labour law.  
The rest—93% of the labour force—works in what is known as the ‘unorganized’ 
or ‘informal’ economy.”); see also Priya Deshingkar, Extending Labour Inspections to 
the Informal Sector and Agriculture 7 (Chronic Poverty Research Ctr., Working 
Paper No. 154, 2009), http://www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads/publication_ 
files/WP154%20Deshingkar.pdf (noting that informal workers, including 
agricultural workers, are not covered by basic labor laws).  
64 See CASTE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST DALITS, supra note 5, at 26 (noting that 
India has failed to provide Dalits with adequate protection against discrimination 
in employment). 
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was ultimately forced to take up sweeping when he could find no 
other employment.65 
Even for those nominally protected under the existing statutory 
scheme, effective recourse has proven difficult or impossible to 
obtain.66  The Equal Remuneration Act is a criminal statute, which 
requires victims of employment discrimination to register 
complaints with labor inspectors designated by the states.67  The 
criminal system is limited in its ability to adequately address 
employment discrimination in its various forms.68  The penalties 
for violations of employment statutes are relatively minimal, and 
suffer from chronic underenforcement.69  The limited legal redress 
offered disincentivizes complaints because victims have little to 
gain from expensive and drawn-out litigation that gives them little 
in the way of compensatory damages.  Corruption is endemic, and 
labor inspectors tend to be overworked and underpaid.70  The 
interests of marginalized groups are thus often neglected.  
4.2. The Legislature’s Abdication of Responsibility 
India’s approach to employment discrimination has also fallen 
short of the Constitution’s egalitarian objectives because of the 
failure of the legislative branch to adequately fulfill its part in 
implementing substantive equality.71  Political expediency tends to 
 
65 Ramesh, supra note 59. 
66 See Aditi Kavarana, Equal Remuneration Act 11 (Ctr. for Civil Soc’y, 
Working Paper No. 15, 2000), http://economics--www.ccsindia.org/ccsindia/ 
policy/rule/ studies/wp0015.pdf (reporting that Assistant Labour Commissioner 
K.R. Sawhney’s claim that enforcement of the Equal Remuneration Act is 
accorded minimal importance in Delhi). 
67 Equal Remuneration Act, supra note 52.  
68 Cf. Julie C. Suk, Procedural Path Dependence: Discrimination and the Civil-
Criminal Divide, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1315 (2008) (proposing that employment 
discrimination should be conceptualized as being neither civil nor criminal in 
order to overcome the limitations of each of these procedural paths). 
69 Kavarana, supra note 66, at 10–11 (explaining that enforcement of these 
laws suffer from inefficiency since, among other issues, labor inspectors are often 
over-burdened with work as they are few in number and are required to oversee 
the implementation of more than 28 labor laws, in addition to the general 
reluctance of workers to file complaints). 
70 Id. at 10. 
71 Sood, supra note 17, at 847–48 (noting the danger of “judicial overreaching” 
and the Supreme Court’s activism while arguing that the judiciary lacks the 
competence of the legislative and executive branches to enact laws and make 
administrative decisions). 
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drive legislative decisions, and there is a perceived need by 
legislators to appease influential voting blocs.72  That need for 
political support makes legislators hesitant to champion 
controversial initiatives that seek to mitigate discrimination against 
minorities when these initiatives do not align with the legislators’ 
political interests.73  Thus, influential members of nominally 
disadvantaged castes have gained at the expense of the genuinely 
disadvantaged.74  The highly politicized system of compensatory 
discrimination provides one example of this.  New castes are 
continually added to the affirmative action rosters at the behest of 
politicians eager to secure their interest with these groups, with 
little inquiry into their backwardness or lack thereof.75  These 
castes, unlike the Dalits, vary widely in terms of their social and 
economic status with many in fact being economically and 
politically powerful.76  Few are ever removed from the reservation 
lists.77 
The legislative branch has repeatedly reneged on its 
constitutional obligation to introduce legislation to remedy the 
 
72 Pager, supra note 9, at 338 (arguing that a politicized process in the 
determination of “disadvantaged” groups could cause manipulation of the system 
and lead to corruption, as evidenced in India). 
73 Sarkin & Koenig, supra note 22, at 552 (describing the formation of caste-
based interest groups, each lobbying for economic benefits and the extension of 
reservations to members of their caste, is “used by politicians to mobilize support 
for elections and collective action.”).  
74 Id. at 550 (“In general, the benefits only reach those lower caste people who 
have already attained an elite position in society through economics, politics, or 
education.”). 
75 The Dalits, in contrast, tend to be almost uniformly marginalized.  
Reservations tend to dominate any discussion on empowering Dalits, and other 
important considerations are inadequately explored.  In this regard, commentator 
P. Sainath has observed, “In the media, any debate on Dalit rights is about 
reservation, and not about water, health, sanitation or land rights.  In the minds of 
the media audience, we have created a stereotype that Dalit is equal to 
reservation, which is taken out of the context of all these other deprivations.”  
Trend of Repackaging Casteism Growing, THE HINDU (Chennai), Dec. 7, 2007, 
http://www.hindu.com/2007/12/07/stories/2007120759081200.htm. 
76 Narula, supra note 8, at 324–25 (noting that the Indian government 
implemented on individuals who attempt to claim disadvantaged status to receive 
benefits a more complex test, which accounts for a variety of social, educational, 
and economic factors such that the claimant’s occupation and wealth, for example, 
would be considered).   
77 Pager, supra note 9, at 338 (arguing that the cause of this permanent status 
is rooted in the “reservation politics,” which “dominate election campaigns and 
attract corruption”). 
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effects of discrimination on disadvantaged minorities.  Although 
the media, the public, and the Sachar Committee have called for a 
comprehensive employment statute in recent years, no concrete 
action in this direction has yet been taken.78  Nor has the legislature 
followed up on proposals to establish a centralized agency to 
address discrimination in employment.79  Large gaps remain in the 
employment discrimination framework, and there has been little 
action to fill this void.  
The legislature’s inadequate discharge of its responsibilities has 
forced the judiciary to assume an increasingly activist position.80  
For example, the Court created so-called public interest litigation, a 
framework that empowers public interest agencies and the public 
to litigate claims on behalf of underprivileged victims of alleged 
government discrimination or inaction.81  In Vishaka v. State of 
Rajasthan, the Supreme Court of India filled a conspicuous void in 
employment discrimination law by issuing comprehensive sexual 
harassment guidelines binding on both public and private 
employers.82  The Court issued these guidelines after considering a 
case in which a government employee had been raped in 
retaliation for her work against rural child marriage.83  Even 
though the sexual assault occurred in a public workplace, the 
Court’s resultant employment discrimination guidelines regulated 
private employers too, underscoring judicial activism.  In drafting 
these guidelines, the Court pointed to the complete absence of 
 
78 See Anti-Discrimination/Sex Equality, supra note 15 (stating that in 2006, the 
Sachar Committee recommended a new framework for addressing discrimination 
against minorities in employment, arguing that “India needs an equality 
legislation that protects multiple characteristics, extends beyond the private and 
public divide and addresses manifest discrimination in society”). 
79 See id. (highlighting the 2008 Menon Committee’s recommendation that an 
Equal Opportunity Commission be formed to address the grievances of minority 
workers). 
80 See Madhav Khosla, Addressing Judicial Activism in the Indian Supreme Court: 
Towards an Evolved Debate, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 55, 56 (2009) 
(examining how a particular academic approach can contribute to the evolving 
discourse on judicial activism in the Indian Supreme Court). 
81 See Sarkin & Koenig, supra note 22, at 560 (noting that the Indian Supreme 
Court’s introduction of public interest litigation has contributed to increasing 
opportunities for the adjudication of incidents of alleged discrimination). 
82 See Vishaka v. Rajasthan, (1997) 6 S.C.C. 241 (India) (citing a petition 
brought by social activists that sought to bring attention to the rights of working 
women and assist in identifying methods by which gender equality in India can 
be achieved). 
83 Id. 
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legislation addressing the pervasive problem of sexual harassment 
in the workplace.84  The Court also acknowledged the 
shortcomings of a judicially mandated sexual harassment 
framework, but maintained that the importance of the issue 
necessitated extraordinary action.85  It stipulated that its guidelines 
would be binding only until appropriate legislation was enacted.86  
Legislative inaction has thus enabled the Supreme Court to assume 
an increasingly prominent role in shaping employment 
discrimination policy. 
4.3. The Supreme Court’s Intermingling of Formal and Substantive 
Equality 
The effective implementation of substantive equality in the 
realm of employment has also been hindered by the Supreme 
Court’s seemingly random intermingling of formal equality 
principles with a substantive equality framework that has at times 
drawn upon regressive cultural norms.87  The Court’s embrace of a 
primarily substantive approach to equality is reflected in its 
recognition of the differences between social groups.88  Thus, the 
Court has repeatedly upheld the validity of affirmative action 
schemes to benefit disadvantaged castes and women.  The Court 
has noted that a strictly neutral application of laws and policies, as 
required by formal equality, will not meaningfully implement the 
 
84 Id. 
85 Id.  For a discussion of the drawbacks of judicial policymaking, see Sood, 
supra note 17, at 847–48 (explaining that, as appointed officials, judges are not 
directly accountable to the people, that the judiciary is inherently limited in its 
ability to acquire a wide range of information to create effective policy, and that 
judicial overreaching risks retaliation by the other governmental branches, 
leading to loss of judicial credibility). 
86 Id. 
87 Kannabiran, supra note 24, at 90 (explaining the issue of sex discrimination 
in the context of relationships as expressed in the jurisprudence on sex 
discrimination). 
88 See, e.g., Kerala v. Thomas, (1976) 2 S.C.C. 310 (India) (permitting the 
government of the state of Kerala to make special exceptions, other than 
reservations, for members of the scheduled castes and tribes in government 
employment); see also Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477 
(India) (affirming the state’s authority to make provision, in the form of 
reservations, concessions, or exceptions, for the advancement of the backward 
classes, provided that backwardness was not determined solely on the basis of 
caste). 
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guarantee of equality enshrined in the Constitution.89  Although 
the Court has, on many occasions, appropriately recognized the 
disparities in social standing among different groups, it has not 
uniformly applied these substantive equality principles in cases 
involving extremely underprivileged parties.  The Court has, on 
occasion, resorted to a shortsighted, selective application of formal 
equality principles, specifically in the context of cases involving 
discrimination against women, and the incoherence of its doctrine 
in this regard has yielded unsatisfactory results.  Thus, for 
instance, in Javed v. State of Haryana, the Supreme Court upheld a 
state law that prevented people with more than two children from 
serving in municipal government roles in spite of evidence that 
such a requirement would disproportionately burden women, who 
are often pressured or coerced by husbands and in-laws into 
having more children than they otherwise wish to bear.90 
In Air India v. Nergesh Meerza, the Court was confronted with a 
discriminatory policy that distinguished between the male and 
female members of the cabin crew of India’s biggest airline.  Air 
India established separate cadres, with different terms of 
employment for the male assistant flight pursers and the female 
 
89 See Thomas, 2 S.C.C. 310 at 513 (“The principle of proportionate equality is 
attained only when equals are tr[e]ated equally and unequals are treated 
unequally.”). 
90 Javed v. Haryana, A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 3057 (India) (“It was also submitted that 
the impugned disqualification would hit the women worst, inasmuch as in the 
Indian society they have no independence and they almost helplessly bear a third 
child if their husbands want them to do so.  This contention need not detain us 
any longer.  A male who compels his wife to bear a third child would disqualify 
not only his wife, but himself as well.  We do not think that with the awareness 
which is rising in Indian women folk, they are so helpless as to be compelled to 
bear a third child even though they do not wish to do so.”); see also Letter from 
Melissa Upreti, Senior Manager & Legal Adviser for Asia, Ctr. for Reproductive 
Rights, to the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Apr. 17, 2008), 
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/info-ngos/CFRR 
India40.pdf (“These types of policies disproportionately affect women, as they fail 
to take into account the ‘social context of early marriages, early pregnancies and 
son preferences . . . all the responsibility is placed only on individuals, particularly 
women, with serious consequences for them.’  Policies such as the Haryana 
provision exacerbate social problems such as sex-selective abortions and the 
abandonment of female infants.  Other consequences of the Haryana policy and 
similar include rampant falsification of hospital and birth records; marital 
desertion; divorce; denial of paternity by male political candidates; and general 
disenfranchisement of the women who are already underrepresented in decision-
making bodies—those from marginalized and poor communities.”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
04_SHENOY (DO NOT DELETE) 8/6/2013  7:39 PM 
628 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 34:3 
airhostesses.91  The two classes performed substantially similar 
types of work.92  The policy at issue required airhostesses, but not 
assistant pursers, to quit (1) upon marriage, if it occurred within 
four years of joining the airline, (2) upon conception of a child, or 
(3) upon reaching the age of thirty-five, unless granted a special 
extension up to the age of forty-five.93  In a convoluted opinion that 
mixed substantive and formal equality provisions, the Court 
upheld certain parts of the policy while striking others.  In 
upholding the clause that required airhostesses to remain 
unmarried for four years after joining the airline, the Court 
reasoned that the provision was in the interests of the employees.94  
In the Court’s view, the requirement would ensure that 
airhostesses would only enter into the institution of marriage 
physically prepared and with the necessary maturity.95  The Court 
also upheld the differential retirement ages for airhostesses and 
pursers, observing in this regard that the two cadres were separate 
classes and therefore did not have to be governed by the same 
terms of employment.96  It stipulated, however, that extensions of 
employment up to the age of forty-five were to be granted on a 
non-discretionary basis provided that the airhostess in question 
was in good health, in order to ensure non-discrimination within 
the airhostess cadre.97  Finally, the Court struck down the 
prohibition on pregnancy, remarking that “divert[ing] the ordinary 
course of human nature” in this manner was “an open insult to 
Indian womanhood—the most sacrosanct and cherished 
institution.”98  It wholeheartedly sanctioned, however, a proffered 
alternative version of the provision that mandated retirement upon 
an airhostess’ third pregnancy.99  
Upon nearly identical facts, in July 2003, the Supreme Court in 
Air India Cabin Crew Association v. Yeshawinee Merchant reversed a 
 
91 Air India v. Nergesh Meerza, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1829 (India) (discussing the 
disparity in treatment between employees of the airline on the basis of sex, 
including the employees’ age of retirement and promotional opportunities). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
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Bombay High Court decision mandating non-discrimination 
between the male and female cadres, upholding in full its 1989 
Nergesh Meerza decision.100  In delivering its opinion, the Court 
noted that some of the airhostesses were members of the union that 
had negotiated these disparate terms.101  It reflected, with regard to 
the earlier retirement age mandated for airhostesses, that “[t]here 
is nothing objectionable for airhostesses to wish for a peaceful and 
tension-free life at home with their families in the middle age and 
avoid remaining away for long durations on international flights,” 
apparently overlooking the fact that the airhostesses challenging 
the policy were not so inclined.102  Perhaps most surprisingly, the 
Court, viewing the union’s negotiation of the conditions of 
retirement as evidence that the airhostesses considered this 
provision “favourable to them,” categorized this provision as the 
type of “special treatment” authorized by the Equal Remuneration 
Act to be performed in favor of women.103  In other words, the 
 
100 Air India Cabin Crew Ass’n v. Yeshawinee Merchant, A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 187 
(India) (reviewing the correctness of the view taken by the Bombay High Court 
with respect to the alleged sex discrimination on the part of Air India against its 
employees).   
101 See id. (“Where terms and conditions are fixed through collective 
bargaining as a comprehensive package deal in the course of industrial 
adjudication and terms of service and retirement age are fixed under agreements, 
settlements or awards, the same cannot be termed as unfavourable treatment 
meted out to the women workers only on basis of their sex and one or the other 
alone tinkered so as to retain the beneficial terms dehors other offered as part of a 
package deal.”).  Cf. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1458 (2009) 
(holding that provisions in a collective bargaining agreement compelling 
arbitration of statutory claims are enforceable). 
102 Yeshawinee Merchant, A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 187 at ¶ 57.  These disparate terms of 
employment now dictated as follows: (1) that airhostesses retire at the age of fifty 
while pursers have until the age of fifty-eight to do so, (2) that women retire upon 
their third pregnancy, while men are free to continue working regardless of how 
many children they have, (3) that women are not entitled to hold supervisory 
positions on board the aircraft and (4) that airhostesses older than thirty-five years 
old receive yearly gynecological examinations as a condition of employment, 
while pursers are exempt from any examination.  See also Anupama Katakam, A 
Case of Discrimination, FRONTLINE, Oct. 11, 2003, http://www.frontlineonnet.com/ 
fl2021/ stories/ 20031024005413000.htm. 
103 See Yeshawinee Merchant, A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 187 at ¶ 39 (“The twin Articles 15 
and 16 prohibit a discriminatory treatment but not preferential or special 
treatment of women, which is a positive measure in their favour.  The 
Constitution does not prohibit the employer to consider sex in making the 
employment decisions where this is done pursuant to a properly or legally 
chartered affirmative action plan.”).  This finding is particularly startling because 
the lower court had found that one of Air India’s central reasons for establishing 
separate cadres for male and female staff was the universal opposition of male 
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Court interpreted the substantive equality exception to the Equal 
Remuneration Act, which permits the government to take special 
action for the benefit of women, to allow Air India to mandate that 
its female employees retire at an earlier age than similarly situated 
males.   
Nergesh Meerza is widely cited by scholars as a thorn in the 
Supreme Court’s substantive equality jurisprudence.104  In 
interpreting the equality provisions of the Constitution, the Court 
employed myopic and circular reasoning that essentially upheld 
continuing discriminatory treatment based on a superficial 
division of men and women into different classes that assigned 
men arguably preferable terms of employment.105  The results fell 
far short of the egalitarian objectives expressed by the framers of 
the Constitution. 
Consistent with a substantive approach to equality, the Nergesh 
Meerza and Yeshawinee Merchant Courts viewed themselves to be 
acting for the particular benefit of female workers, whom they 
perceived as being differently situated and having different 
priorities from their male coworkers.  The Court believed that in 
 
staff to the possibility of reporting to a female supervisor.  Air India drafted the 
policy to ensure that only a male staff member could serve as a flight supervisor.  
Kannabiran, supra note 24, at 95 (“The [Bombay High Court] rejected this 
argument[,] asserting that ‘the hierarchy on board the aircraft will be based on 
seniority irrespective of sex,’ a decision the Supreme Court set aside.’”); see also 
Katakam, supra note 102 (describing the apparent nature of the union’s priorities 
in the statement by Rajeev Joshi, Vice-President of the Air-India Cabin Crew 
Association, the union responsible for negotiating these terms: “[T]he girls were 
recruited to serve passengers.  The airline wanted young and beautiful women to 
be the face of Air-India.  How can we keep up our service standards with women 
who don’t look fresh and capable?”). 
104 See, e.g., Kannabiran, supra note 24, at 92 (citing various passages from the 
Nergesh Meerza decision that demonstrated the court’s focus on the role Indian 
women play in family planning and analyzing the provisions concerning the four-
year ban on marriage and the termination of employment upon a woman’s first 
pregnancy). 
105 See Nergesh Meerza, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1829 at ¶ 59 (employing circular 
reasoning that nullified constitutional and statutory guarantees of equality, the 
Court essentially accepted Air India’s blatantly discriminatory system of 
classification as per se evidence of men and women being differently situated for 
the purposes of formal equality analysis: “[A]Hs [Air Hostesses] from [sic] an 
absolutely separate category from that of the AFPs [Air Flight Pursers] in many 
respects having different grades, different promotional avenues and different 
service conditions.”); see also Kannabiran, supra note 24, at 95 (noting that the 
employer is not required to demonstrate, task by task, the differences in work 
requirements for males and females in order to justify differential treatment based 
on gender). 
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permitting airhostesses to negotiate terms purportedly favorable to 
them, it was acting in their best interests.106  This approach to 
substantive equality ultimately failed because it assumed, on the 
basis of regressive gendered norms, that male and female 
employees had different priorities.107  It imposed what it believed 
to be substantive equality of opportunity to negotiate terms of 
employment without inquiring into the actual bargaining power of 
women within the union or the ways in which the gendered 
context in which they were operating limited their ability to 
negotiate better terms for themselves.108  
Compounding the problem was the Court’s myopic application 
of formal equality.  It essentially viewed the airline’s classification 
of male and female employees into separate cadres, with attendant 
disparate terms of employment, as evidence of these two cadres 
being separate classes not similarly situated for the purposes of 
formal equality analysis.  Although the Court applied formal 
equality within the class of airhostesses to strike down the 
discretionary aspect of extensions beyond the default age of 
retirement, it refused to mandate that the airline offer the same 
terms of employment to both male and female employees.  This 
 
106 See Yeshawinee Merchant, A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 187 at ¶ 41 (“In employment 
requiring duties on Air craft, gender-neutral provisions of service may not be 
found necessarily to be beneficial for women.  The nature of duties and functions 
on board of an Air craft do deserve some kind of a different and preferential 
treatment of women compared to men.”). 
107 For an overview of the Supreme Court’s application of similarly 
regressive reasoning in recent case law in this and other contexts, see Kannabiran, 
supra note 24. 
108 This is a particularly pressing concern because trade unions in India have 
failed to adequately prioritize the interests of women and other underprivileged 
groups.  See Rohini Hensman, Trade Unions and Women’s Autonomy: Organisational 
Strategies of Women Workers in India, in GENDER, DIVERSITY AND TRADE UNIONS: 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 95, 95 (Fiona Colgan & Sue Ledwith eds., 2002) 
(“[W]hile some progress has certainly been made, women and disadvantaged 
sections of society remain marginalised in the labour force, and trade unions still 
fail to recognise the importance of tackling this issue.”); Kamala Sankaran & 
Roopa Madhav, Gender Equality and Social Dialogue in India 32–33 (ILO, Working 
Paper No. 1/2011, Jan. 2011), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/ 
public/---dgreports/---gender/documents/publication/wcms_150428.pdf (“The 
lack of women in such negotiations also has adverse effects on women.  The 
agreements concluded with the cabin crew in the Air India [sic] agreed to a 
disparity in retirement age for women; challenges by individual women were 
turned down by the courts on the ground that these were binding on all cabin 
crew.  Even in the recent collective agreements entered into by the Air India Cabin 
Crew Association and Air India, there were no women representing employees.”). 
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decision was so despite the Court’s acknowledgment of a 
substantial similarity in the types of work performed by the 
airhostesses and the pursers.109  In accepting the airline’s 
superficial distinction between the two classes based on 
discriminatory terms of employment and the purportedly different 
interests and priorities of the two groups, and in refusing to 
require equal conditions for similar work, as required by the terms 
of the Equal Remuneration Act, the Court intermingled substantive 
and formal equality in such a manner as to render both doctrines 
ineffective.  
5. SOLUTIONS 
5.1. Legislative Solutions 
The deeply ingrained and multilayered structural inequalities 
that underlie Indian society necessitate the adoption of a 
substantive approach to equality that takes into account the fact 
that actors differently situated may not benefit in the same ways 
from a uniform application of equality principles.110  However, 
India’s existing approach to substantive equality has yielded 
unpredictable and unsatisfactory results, in part, because the 
existing framework is limited in its reach and flawed in its 
approach to employment discrimination. 
The limitations of a primarily reservation-based system and the 
inadequacy of the current statutory scheme to account for various 
types of discrimination against a full range of disadvantaged 
groups significantly qualify the ability of the current framework to 
address the problem of employment discrimination.111  One 
possible solution that has been increasingly proposed in recent 
 
109 See Nergesh Meerza, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1829 at ¶ 62 (observing that the 
difference in the type of work performed by the two cadres was “one of degree 
rather than of kind”). 
110 In this regard, Chief Justice Bhagwati of the Indian Supreme Court 
observed, “In a hierarchical society with an indelible feudal stamp and incurable 
actual inequality, it is absurd to suggest that progressive measures to eliminate 
group disabilities . . . are antagonistic to equality on the ground that every 
individual is entitled to equality of opportunity based purely on merit . . . .”  Jain 
v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 942, 968 (India) (discussing the concept of 
equality under the Constitution of India and the prospect of equality becoming a 
“living reality for the large masses of people” in the country). 
111 INDIA CONST. arts. 14–16. 
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years has been to extend reservations to the private sector.112  
However, this step would have to be carefully considered in view 
of the significant opposition such proposals have met in the private 
sector.113  India is a developing country, with strong reasons to 
encourage a competitive business environment, and the possible 
detrimental effects of such legislation on industry would therefore 
need to be fully explored. 
A less drastic solution might involve the legislation of a 
comprehensive umbrella employment statute,114 which would 
guarantee freedom from discrimination in the workplace to a full 
range of disadvantaged minorities.  Such a statute would articulate 
the types of adverse actions that would qualify as illegal 
employment discrimination and the remedies to be made available 
to victims of such discrimination.  It might impose a responsibility 
on private employers to take reasonable steps to ensure the full 
participation of minorities in the workplace.  Given existing 
hierarchies, such a provision would necessarily require that 
employers make certain reasonable accommodations to create an 
environment in which disadvantaged workers would have the 
opportunity to function on par with their more privileged 
coworkers.  An employment discrimination statute would provide 
 
112 Narula, supra note 8, at 319 (describing the arguments of Indian economist 
Sukhadeo Thorat in favor of extending reservations to the private sector to redress 
market discrimination against Dalits); Anti-Discrimination/Sex Equality, supra note 
15 (elaborating on the issues pertaining to anti-discrimination and sex equality, 
including the constitutional background, the existing legislative framework, and a 
proposed law concerning the matter).  State governments have taken some steps 
in this direction.  See, e.g., Mayawati Announces Reservations in Private Sector, 
EXPRESSINDIA (Jan. 18, 2008), http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/Maya 
wati-announces-reservations-in-private-sector/262923/ (highlighting an initiative 
by the government of Uttar Pradesh to introduce reservations in companies 
working on projects in conjunction with the state). 
113 Narula, supra note 8 at 319 (stating private employers and political parties 
still strongly oppose the private sector proposal).  For a discussion of the 
arguments in favor of and against reservations in the private sector, see generally 
Jayati Ghosh, On Reservations in the Private Sector, FRONTLINE, Nov. 4, 2005, http:// 
www.flonnet.com/fl2222/stories/20051104004110800.htm (explaining that 
although a policy of reservation in the private sector would not affect efficiency, it 
would help to correct historically entrenched and still pervasive social 
discrimination); see also G. Thimmaiah, Implications of Reservations in Private Sector, 
40 ECON. & POL. WKLY 745, 745–50 (2005) (outlining the implications of the 
proposal to extend reservations to the private sector). 
114 Cf. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (prohibiting 
discrimination in employment on the basis of sex, race, color, religion, or national 
origin). 
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guidelines for the courts in interpreting state guarantees of 
equality, and would extend equality protections to the private and 
agricultural sectors.  It might incorporate a presumption in favor of 
disadvantaged employees in order to ease the extremely heavy 
burden of litigation.115   
The existing employment discrimination framework would be 
further enhanced through the provision of positive incentives such 
as tax breaks, subsidies, and new business licenses to encourage 
employers to hire more workers from disadvantaged groups and 
to take extraordinary steps to ensure substantive equality in the 
workplace.  Employers should be encouraged to educate 
themselves and their employees about their rights and 
responsibilities under the law.  Positive incentives would likely be 
met with a greater level of acceptance within the private sector 
than would more drastic remedies such as private-sector 
reservations.  They would carry the additional benefit of ensuring 
a happier and better-trained workforce, as employers would be 
incentivized to provide such accommodations as additional 
training for workers from disadvantaged groups. 
The limitations of the existing framework might be further 
addressed through the provision of civil remedies in addition to 
the existing criminal penalties for violations of employment law.  
The Equal Remuneration Act is a criminal statute, which prescribes 
fines and imprisonment for illegal discrimination.116  Although the 
criminal law places the responsibility of prosecuting offenses on 
the state, and thereby alleviates the burden of litigation on victims 
of employment discrimination who may have limited financial 
resources, the absence of damages may disincentivize the pursuit 
of judicial remedies.  Concomitantly, the relatively minimal 
penalties associated with infractions fail to deter employers from 
 
115 Such presumptions are relatively common in the Indian legal system.  See, 
e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Burdens of Equality: Burdens of Proof and 
Presumptions in Indian and American Civil Rights Law, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 89, 101 
(“[U]pon the establishment of certain facts in an abetment of suicide prosecution, 
a court may presume that the defendant abetted the victim’s suicide . . . . 
[P]resumptions of this kind reflect ‘those natural inferences which the ‘common 
course of natural events,’ human conduct, and public and private business 
suggest to us.’”) (quoting M.C. SARKAR, S.C. SARKAR, & PROABHAS C. SARKAR, 1 
SARKAR’S LAW OF EVIDENCE 66, 67 (13th ed. 1993)). 
116 Equal Remuneration Act, 1976, No. 25, Amendment 1987, No. 49 (India). 
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engaging in discrimination.117  Widespread corruption among 
labor inspectors and the fact that the inspectors are overworked 
and underpaid result in a failure to adequately prioritize women’s 
interests.118  These obstacles deter prospective complainants from 
asserting their rights under the Act.  The provision of a civil cause 
of action may bridge this gap by providing incentives for victims to 
seek judicial recourse and by ensuring that, at least in some cases, 
those pursuing judicial remedies will have a vested interest in the 
outcome.  High-profile employment litigation, with significant 
damages at stake, may act as a general deterrent to employers who 
might otherwise discriminate with impunity. 
To ensure adequate protection for complainants with limited 
means, the Indian government should explore possible incentives 
to encourage public interest organizations and other entities to 
help provide adequate legal representation.119  Members of 
disadvantaged groups are often unaware of their rights, and thus 
cannot take advantage of the protections afforded to them under 
the law.120  An agency that could work in tandem with the Courts 
and would have the power to oversee, investigate, and litigate 
employment disputes would help fill this gap.121  Such an agency 
would presumably have the resources to effectively issue concrete 
guidelines that would help employers remain within the bounds of 
the law and would assist the Courts in reaching informed 
judgments.122  It would also have the power to oversee the actions 
 
117 Indira Hirway & Neha Shah, Labour and Employment Under Globalization: 
The Case of Gujarat, 46 ECON. & POL. WKLY., no. 22, 57, 62 (May 28, 2011).  
118 See Deshingkar, supra note 63, at 12–14 (discussing the inadequate labor 
inspection machinery in India).  
119 Public interest litigation is one vehicle by which public service agencies 
are empowered to help provide legal representation.  See supra section 4.2. 
120 Chandola, supra note 10, at 128 (explaining that although the untouchable 
litigants have access to the judicial system in India, sometimes they do not pursue 
legal remedies due to their ignorance regarding legal options).  
121 India might be guided in this regard by the example of, for instance, the 
American Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 
122 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in the United States, for 
instance, provides guidance as to the government’s equal employment 
opportunity program and adjudicates disputes.  See About EEOC, U.S. EQUAL 
EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ (last visited Mar. 13, 
2013) (aggregating useful information about the Commission, including its 
purpose, relevant laws, and enforcement and litigation issues relating to 
discrimination against job applicants or employees). 
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of labor inspectors and to address allegations of corruption and 
misconduct within their ranks. 
A more comprehensive framework, which would flesh out and 
expand the existing protections, would help ensure robust 
substantive equality in the realm of employment discrimination 
law.  However, given the failure of the legislature thus far to fulfill 
its part in upholding substantive equality aside from the system of 
reservations, the judiciary may be called upon to continue to take 
an active role in paving the path to fuller minority rights. 
5.2. Judicial Solutions 
The fact that the legislature has been relatively reluctant to take 
bold steps, other than in the form of reservations, to protect 
disadvantaged minorities from discrimination in employment, has 
meant that the judiciary has taken a more active role in upholding 
the rights of the underprivileged.123  Some of the judiciary’s actions 
have been problematic, but in the overall analysis, it has stepped in 
to fill the vacuum created by the legislature’s inaction.124  Although 
structural solutions are more properly the province of the 
legislature, which has the resources and temporal bandwidth to 
enact effective policies, in the current circumstances, it may 
continue to fall to the judiciary to take the necessary steps to prod 
the legislature into fulfilling its part in upholding substantive 
equality.125 
Vishaka opens up a means by which the judiciary may be able 
to provide interim solutions to the deep-rooted structural 
inequalities in India.126  In Vishaka, the Court issued sexual 
harassment guidelines that were to be binding upon employers 
until the Legislature enacted a comprehensive sexual harassment 
law.127  Following the decision in Vishaka, the Parliament 
 
123 Sood, supra note 17, at 845 (characterizing the activism of the judiciary as 
largely the result of an effort to compensate for the inaction of the legislative and 
executive branches of government). 
124 Narula, supra note 8, at 322 (describing the Indian judiciary’s attempt to 
reconcile India’s constitutional ideals with the “abysmal” condition of Dalit social 
reality).  
125 For a discussion of the problems inherent in judicial policymaking, see 
text accompanying supra note 17. 
126 See Sood, supra note 17, at 843 (noting that Courts have extremely wide 
leeway in fashioning appropriate remedies in public interest litigation). 
127 See Vishaka v. Rajasthan, (1997) 6 S.C.C. 241 (India) at 6–10 (noting that 
these guidelines are necessary “in the absence of enacted law to provide fro [sic] 
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introduced a sexual harassment bill that publicly acknowledged 
the Court’s role in helping to bring this matter to the notice of the 
Legislature.128  Although, as was observed by the Court itself, 
judicially imposed corrective measures may not be an ideal 
solution, they may in some measure alleviate the worst of the 
problems that exist in the employment sphere.129  Such action on 
the part of the Court may also play a useful role in prodding the 
Legislature into action.130  The Legislature has often found it 
expedient to let the courts take the first step in addressing divisive 
matters that have the power to backfire against legislators, who are 
directly accountable to the people.131  Whatever one thinks of the 
Legislature for relinquishing its obligations in this manner, it may 
be more willing to act when the Court has already confronted 
divisive issues in the first instance. 
In its interpretation of the State’s guarantees of equality, 
particularly with respect to women, the judiciary should strive for 
a richer vision of substantive equality, free from the regressive 
effects of traditional norms.  Substantive equality, as a matter of 
principle, recognizes that in an intensely hierarchical social context, 
members of disadvantaged groups are not similarly situated to 
members of more privileged groups such that formal equality 
would provide meaningful protection.  When there is a significant 
disparity in the social standing of individuals, a neutral application 
of laws and policies will operate to the disadvantage of subjugated 
groups.  However, for substantive equality to be meaningful, it 
cannot rely on the same stereotypical norms that underlie existing 
 
the effective enforcement of the basic human right of gender equality and 
guarantee against sexual harassment and abuse, more particularly against sexual 
harassment at work places”).  
128 See Sood, supra note 17, at 872.  The so-called Protection of Women 
Against Sexual Harassment at Workplace Bill remains pending in Parliament.  
Himanshi Dhawan, Sexual Harassment Law May Soon Cover Domestic Workers, 
TIMES OF INDIA, Jan. 12, 2012, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ india/Sexual-
harassment-law-may-soon-cover-domestic-workers/articleshow/11456584.cms. 
129 See Sood, supra note 17, at 845–46 (noting that the public is strongly 
supportive of the judiciary’s activism, particularly in light of the failure of the 
other branches of government to fulfill their obligations). 
130 Id. at 844 (noting that the Court has on occasion directed the Legislature to 
enact necessary laws through the vehicle of public interest litigation). 
131 Id. at 847–48 (stating that some government branches have even welcomed 
the judiciary’s activism, especially when it enabled politicians to abdicate their 
legislative responsibility, claiming they must adhere to the Court’s orders). 
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social classifications.132  Judicial legitimization of regressive 
stereotypes has the effect of reinforcing social hierarchies that serve 
to devalue certain people at the expense of others.133 
Nergesh Meerza and Yeshawinee Merchant demonstrate that the 
intermingling of substantive and formal equality, without regard 
to the ways in which hierarchical norms define the social position 
and expectations of members of disadvantaged groups, 
exacerbates existing structural inequality.134  A strict application of 
formal equality, which would have invalidated the classification 
between pursers and airhostesses, may have produced more 
palatable results in these cases; however, it has been observed that, 
in intensely hierarchical contexts, formal equality often works to 
the disadvantage of subordinated groups.135 
To adequately account for the differences in both social 
standing and access to opportunity between privileged and 
underprivileged groups, the judiciary should, as a matter of 
general practice, first look at cases through the lens of a substantive 
equality approach designed to dismantle those factors that operate 
to perpetuate the subordination of the disadvantaged.  Formal 
 
132 See Kannabiran, supra note 24, at 90 (“To the extent that they reflect and 
correspond with systems of social inequality, differentiation and classification 
may be the source of discrimination.”). 
133 Scholars have similarly lamented this judicial tendency to legitimize 
regressive stereotypes in legal contexts outside employment discrimination.  See 
id. at 91 (observing that “the court regret[ted] the fact that women are chattel 
within marriage and yet lock[ed] them firmly into the position of chattel by 
substituting constitutional morality with codes of public morality,” with regard to 
a case in which the Supreme Court upheld a statutory provision that empowered 
men, but not women, to prosecute those who committed adultery with their 
spouses). 
134 See Air India Cabin Crew Ass’n v. Yeshawinee Merchant, A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 
187 (India).  Interestingly enough, Air India discarded its discriminatory system of 
classification in 2005 in response to a legislative directive to the effect that the 
differential retirement ages for men and women should be eliminated.  It then had 
to fight to defend this decision in the courts, as male members of the cabin crew 
challenged a new provision that permitted women to serve in supervisory 
capacities.  In 2011, the Supreme Court upheld Air India’s decision to implement 
gender-neutral terms of employment, ending once and for all the airhostesses’ 
long and hard-fought battle for equality (on paper, at least).  See Sankaran & 
Madhav, supra note 108, and Zoe Li, Air India Operates (Almost) All-Female Flights, 
CNN TRAVEL (Mar. 8, 2012), http://travel.cnn.com/mumbai/visit/air-india-
operates-almost-all-female-flights-868673. 
135 See, e.g., Javed v. Haryana, AIR 2003 S.C. 3057 (India) (failing to consider 
the unequal burden on women imposed by a state ban on serving in public office 
after having more than two children). 
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equality should be applied only as a secondary approach, after 
having established that the relevant parties are in fact 
meaningfully similarly situated, such that application of formal 
equality will not merely overlook existing structures of 
subordination. 
A more effective approach to substantive equality in Nergesh 
Meerza and Yeshawinee Merchant would have more closely 
examined the ways in which the collective bargaining process 
operates to the disadvantage of the airhostesses.  Factors such as 
the relative bargaining power of the airhostesses within the union 
and the possibility that the same gendered expectations that 
originally led Air India to create separate male and female cadres 
might impose limitations on the airhostesses’ ability to 
meaningfully negotiate would be relevant to this inquiry.136 
Formal equality should be limited to cases where the relevant 
parties are employed in similar positions and are similarly situated 
in terms of their relative advantage or disadvantage.  In a 
hierarchical employment context in which women and members of 
the scheduled and backward classes are routinely assigned 
subordinate positions and inferior terms of employment, it may 
well be that members of these groups are not similarly situated 
relative to more-advantaged employees such that application of 
formal equality would yield satisfactory results. 
6. CONCLUSION 
India’s approach to substantive equality has only been 
modestly successful in alleviating the deep-seated structural 
problems that facilitate discrimination in employment.  The 
existing system addresses only isolated aspects of the problem 
because it primarily rests on a system of quotas that pertain only to 
the public sector and because it does not incorporate a 
comprehensive statutory scheme that addresses intended and 
unintended discrimination in its various forms and against a full 
range of disadvantaged groups. 
The Legislature’s failure to take decisive action to address 
discrimination in the workplace has exacerbated the problem.  The 
employment discrimination framework remains extremely 
 
136 For an analysis of the inadequate consideration given by trade unions to 
the interests of women and other disadvantaged groups, see Hensman, supra note 
108. 
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fractured, and the rights of the scheduled and backward castes and 
women are neglected.  This inaction has forced the judiciary to take 
on an extremely activist posture to protect the rights of the 
disadvantaged, a circumstance that could prove problematic in 
certain situations.137  However, in the absence of effective 
legislative policy, the judiciary should continue to further the cause 
of substantive equality in the manner employed in Vishaka.138  This 
kind of activism on the part of the Court may provide interim relief 
and serve the purpose of prodding the legislature into fulfilling its 
part in upholding substantive equality. 
In interpreting the State’s guarantees of equality, the judiciary 
should apply a primarily substantive approach that is free from the 
regressive effects of traditional values and norms.  Formal equality 
should be applied as a secondary framework, after establishing 
that the relevant parties are similarly situated in terms of their 
levels of (dis)advantage, such that the application of formal 
equality principles will not perpetuate existing social hierarchies.  
A more robust substantive equality of opportunity will, hopefully, 
be a step towards eradicating the structures of subordination that 
operate as barriers to advancement in all spheres of life.   
 
137 See Sood, supra note 17, at 847–48 (highlighting the dangers of judicial 
overreaching, including lack of accountability on the part of judges and the 
potential loss of credibility that could result from the judiciary venturing into 
policy matters beyond its competence). 
138 Id. at 846 (underscoring the importance of judicial activism in India, given 
the severity of inequality in this context and the possibility that people may resort 
to extra-legal remedies in the absence of judicial recourse). 
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